The Equitable Lien in Florida by Boyer, Ralph A. & Kutun, Barry
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 20 Number 3 Article 7 
5-1-1966 
The Equitable Lien in Florida 
Ralph A. Boyer 
Barry Kutun 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Ralph A. Boyer and Barry Kutun, The Equitable Lien in Florida, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 731 (1966) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol20/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
THE EQUITABLE LIEN IN FLORIDA*
RALPH A. BOYER** AND BARRY KUTUN***
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 731
1l. TYPES OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION OF AN EQUITABLE LIEN ........ 734
A. In General ........................................................... 734
B. H omestead Property .................................................. 735
III. CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE ImPOSITION OF THE EQUITABLE LIEN ...... 740
A. Particular Relationships ............................................... 740
1. ATTORNEY---CLIENT ................................................. 740
2. BROKER- VENDOR-PURCHASER ........................................ 746
3. IMPROVER--OWNER . ................................................ 748
a. Failure to Comply with the Mechanics' Lien Law .................. 749
b. Failure to Comply with Other Statutory Lien Provisions .......... 758
4. CITY- PROPERTY OWNERS ........................................... 760
5. CO-OBLIGORS ....................................................... 760
6. HUSBAND- W IFE. .................................................... 761
B. Advancement of Funds ................................................ 762
1. JOINT PURCHASERS ................................................. 762
2. PAYMENT OF TAX LIEN ............................................. 762
3. BENEFIT TO ADVANCER UNREALIZED .................................... 763
4. ORAL PROMISE OF SECURITY ......................................... 764
C. Defective M ortgages .................................................. 765
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 765
Equity is a roguish thing, for law we0 have a measure know what to
trust to0 , 6quity is according to the conscience of him that is ohancel-
lor, and as that is larger or narrower so0 is equity. 'Tis all one as if they
should make the tandard for the measure we call a foot, a chancellor's
foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One chancellor has a
long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis the
same thing in the chancellor's conscience.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The general characterization of equity which prefaces this paper
seems particularly appropriate to the equitable lien. The equitable lien
is a remedial device of considerable flexibility adaptable to a wide variety
of circumstances. Judicial definitions and explanations of the lien are
usually framed in generalities so broad as to be of little utility.'
* Acknowledgment is gratefully accorded the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando,
Florida, for its annual grant to the University of Miami School of Law. This contribution
is used at the University of Miami to encourage student research in property law and to
aid professors in the research and preparation of articles. The preparation of this paper
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1. S LDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (1927). Interestingly enough, Justice Terrell in Jones v.
Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 413, 106 So. 127, 129 (1925), stated that the equitable lien is "not
a limitless remedy to be applied according to the measure of the conscience of the particular
chancellor any more than, as an illustrious law-writer said, to the measure of his foot."
2. See, e.g., Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. 730, 739 (6th Cir. 1895).
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It is simply *a right of a special nature over the thing, which
constitutes a charge or incumbrance upon the thing, so that the
very thing itself may be proceeded against in an equitable
action, and either sold or sequestered under a judicial decree,
and its proceeds in the one case, or its rents and profits in the
other, applied upon the demand of the creditor in whose favor
the lien exists.3
Except for the vendor's lien, this paper will examine the Florida law
on equitable liens generally. An attempt will be made to delineate the
circumstances giving rise to such a lien, and to attempt to determine
what standards, if any, have been established. The vendor's lien is perhaps
the best known example of an equitable lien and is worthy of separate
treatment. For that reason, it is excluded from this article and has been
discussed separately.
4
The equitable lien is one of several remedial devices employed to
prevent unjust enrichment. As such, it is desirable to compare and dis-
tinguish it from related devices. The constructive trust is one of the other
remedies with a similar objective.
A legalistic, but rather meaningless distinction, notes that in a trust
there are two estates in the same property 5-the legal estate in the
trustee and the equitable estate in the beneficiary-whereas in an equitable
lien situation there is a legal and equitable title in one person with that
title being subject to a special right, encumbrance or charge in favor of
another? Insofar as the constructive trust is concerned, it is not a trust
in the ordinary sense at all, and it is not contemplated that there shall
be any continuing duties between the "trustee" and "beneficiary." Rather,
the gist of the remedy is the forced conveyance from the "trustee" to the
"beneficiary" so that the person entitled to the property does in fact obtain
it. In general terms, a constructive trust arises where a person who holds
title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another,
on the ground that the title holder would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it.
7
The constructive trust prevents unjust enrichment by compelling
the defendant to convey or surrender property to the plaintiff. The
equitable lien achieves a similar result by giving the plaintiff a security
interest in the property held by the defendant.8 In some situations the
3. Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 412, 106 So. 127, 129 (1925).
4. See Boyer v. Evans, The Vendor's Lien, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767 (1966).
5. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1234 n.5 (5th ed. 1941).
6. This special right is not an estate of any kind; it does not entitle the holder
to a conveyance of the thing nor to its use; it is merely a right to secure the performance
of some outstanding obligation, by means of a proceeding directed against the thing which
is subject to the lien. 4 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 5.
7. 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462.1 (2d ed. 1956).
8. Id. at § 463.
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equitable lien is available as an alternative remedy to the constructive
trust, whereas in other situations it is not. Thus, if the defendant wrong-
fully uses money of the plaintiff in purchasing property, the plaintiff is
entitled at his option either to a constructive trust or an equitable lien.'
If the former remedy is used, as it likely would be if the property increases
in value, the defendant has to convey the property to the plaintiff. If the
equitable lien remedy is used, the property is sold on foreclosure of the
lien, and the proceeds are used to pay the plaintiff's claim.
In case the plaintiff's equitable interest in the property is less than
the complete ownership of all (or a specific portion) of the title, then the
remedy of equitable lien is available, but that of constructive trust is not.
Thus, for example, if a person makes improvements upon the property
of another as a result of fraud or a mistake of such a character that he
is entitled to restitution, he can enforce an equitable lien but cannot
impose a constructive trust.' Similarly, if an owner wrongfully uses the
money of another to make improvements on his own property, the other
party is entitled to enforce an equitable lien, but not a constructive trust."
Subrogation is also a remedy for the prevention of unjust enrichment.
Subrogation may be defined generally as "the substitution of one for
another as a creditor so that the new creditor succeeds to the former's
rights in law and equity; a legal operation by which a third person who
pays a creditor succeeds to his rights against the debtor as if he were his
assignee.' 2 A person is subrogated to the position of an obligee when
the person's property has been used to discharge an obligation of
another. 3 Subrogation is not allowed where the payment of another's
debt is officious. Subrogation is allowed and the payment considered not
officious under the following circumstances: payment made by mistake;
payment made under fraudulent inducement or other wrongful conduct;
payment by a surety for his debtor; and payment made to protect an
interest of the payor1 4 Further, money used by a debtor without consent
of its owner in discharging a debt of the debtor entitles the owner of the
money to be subrogated to the position of the creditor. 5
When subrogation is proper, the subrogated party can enforce such
rights as the creditor had prior to the payment of the debt. If the creditor
had a claim secured by a mortgage, pledge or lien, then the party paying




12. WEBSTER, DICTIONARY (3d New Int'l Unabr. ed. 1959). For a broader survey of
subrogation see the article in this issue, Cappucio, Subrogation in Florida, 20 U. MmI L.
REv. 000 (1966).
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the plaintiff gets the same rights as the satisfied creditor, neither more nor
less. 6 Thus, if the paid creditor had priority, the party subrogated to the
creditor's rights is entitled to priority; if the creditor had a lien, the subro-
gated party likewise gets a lien. In this respect, subrogation differs from
equitable liens in that in the former situation the subrogee accedes to a
pre-existing lien or one already established, whereas in the case of equit-
able liens, the lienor acquires a new lien which never before existed.
The equitable lien should also be distinguished from the common-
law possessory lien. In addition to the fact that one is cognizable in law
and the other in equity, a fundamental difference is that the equitable
lien does not depend on possession. 7 In fact, lack of possession in the
lienor is normally a prerequisite to, and a chief advantage of, the equitable
lien. A Florida appellate court has stated: "The established rule for im-
position of an equitable lien is that the property in litigation must be in
the possession of the defendant. ... "'I
An equitable lien can arise either from a written contract, showing
the intention to charge particular property with the debt, or it can be
"declared by a court of equity out of general considerations of right and
justice as applied to the relations of the parties and the circumstances of
their dealings."'
This study of the Florida law will commence with an examination
as to what property may be subjected to an equitable lien, and then, as
to what relationships and circumstances have given rise to the imposition
of such a lien.
II. TYPES OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE IMPOSITION
OF AN EQUITABLE LIEN
A. In General
It can be stated generally that any property which is capable of
identification and subject to legal process," so that it may be sold by
16. Ibid.
17. The equitable lien differs essentially from a common-law lien; the latter being
the mere right to retain possession of some chattel until a debt or demand due the
person thus retaining it is satisfied; possession being such a necessary element that
if it is voluntarily surrendered by the creditor the lien is at once extinguished,
while in the former or equitable lien possession remains with the debtor or person
who holds the proprietary interest.
Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 413-414, 106 So. 127, 129 (1925); 1 JoNEs, LIENS § 28,
at 26 (3d ed. 1914).
18. Richard Bertram & Co. v. Barrett, 155 So.2d 409, 412 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
19. 1 JoNEs, LIENS § 27, at 25 (3d ed. 1914). Equitable liens arising from written
contracts showing an intention to charge particular property with a debt, instead of being
discussed under a single heading as a separate major topic, are treated throughout this
article wherever they arise within a particular relationship or circumstance examined.
20. If the property were not subject to a forced sale, the imposition of an equitable
lien would be a futile gesture. A similar recognition is evident in the Mechanics' Lien Law
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judicial decree, may be subjected to the imposition of an equitable
lien."' In Florida both personalty and realty may be so encumbered.22
The equitable lien has extended to such property as a leasehold interest,2
the proceeds of a note, 4 a bank deposit,25 a legatee's interest in an
estate,26 homestead property,2" and the realty of shareholders of a
dissolved corporation.28
B. Homestead Property
The question as to whether Florida homestead property can be sub-
jected to the imposition of an equitable lien was considered at a very
early date. In Jones v. Carpenter29 the trustee of a bankrupt corporation
sought to impose an equitable lien upon the defendant's homestead. The
complaint alleged that the now insolvent defendant, while president of
the bankrupt corporation, had wrongfully withdrawn funds to pay for
certain improvements to his home. The principal defenses which were
asserted were: first, that painting and repairing did not constitute
valuable improvements; and second, that the property was the defendant's
homestead and therefore exempt under the Florida Constitution, Article
10, section 1. The defendant contended that the exception to the home-
stead exemption, allowing a lien for the erection or repair of improve-
ments, was inapplicable.8°
The lower court dismissed the complaint and the trustee appealed.
On review the supreme court considered the defendant's conduct to be
fraudulent and surreptitious. The defendant contributed to the bank-
which permits a lien to be impressed on any legal or equitable interest in real property
which can be reached and sold by legal process. FLA. STAT. § 84.011(12) (1965), defining
19owner.?
21. See infra notes 22-28.
22. Robertson v. Robertson, 12 Fla. Supp. 126 (Broward Cir. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 106
So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1938) ; cases cited infra notes 23-28.
23. Oliver v. Mercaldi, 103 So.2d 665 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1938). See BOYER, FLOamA RAL
EsTATE TRANsACTIoNs § 35.04(3) (1960) [hereinafter cited as BoYEa].
24. Treadwell v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 127 Fla. 40, 172 So. 914 (1937).
25. Mizner Land Corp. v. Abbott, 128 Fla. 489, 175 So. 507 (1937); Lockett v.
Robinson, 31 Fla. 134, 12 So. 649 (1893).
26. In re Barker's Estate, 73 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1954); In re Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 460,
3S So.2d 296 (1948).
27. Jones v. Carpenter, supra note 3.
28. Lake Sarasota, Inc. v. Pan Am. Sur. Co., 140 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. An indebtedness for money borrowed to purchase materials, or pay for labor
bestowed in improving lands, or money expended in the purchase of such materials,
or in payment for such labor, is not an obligation contracted "for the erection
of improvements," nor an obligation contracted for such labor, and is not within
the exceptions of the constitutional provisions. The contract in such case is to repay
money loaned or expended, and not a contract to pay for the erection of improve-
ments, or for labor on the premises. Lewton v. Hower, 18 Fla. 872, 882-83 (1882).
The exception to the exemption, contained in art. X, § 1, reads as follows:
But no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes or assessments, or for the
payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said property, or for the
erection or repair of improvements on the real estate exempted, or for house, field
or other labor performed on the same.
19661
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ruptcy of the corporation by withdrawing funds without authority. Then
he applied the funds to improvements on his own home and claimed
immunity by virtue of the homestead exemption. In reversing the lower
court, the supreme court allowed the trustee to impress an equitable
lien on defendant's homestead. The court recognized that had the de-
fendant borrowed the funds from the corporation, the corporation would
not have been entitled to such a lien. However, in support of the decision,
the court stated:
A homestead in this country is. . . designed to keep sacred
and inviolate the home for the family regardless of the amount
of the indebtedness or the number of creditors of the head of
the family. . . . [B]ut it cannot be employed as a shield and
defense after fraudulently imposing on others."
It is important to take note of the circumstances presented. Any
legal remedy would have been inadequate since the defendant-thief was
insolvent; a money judgment against him would have been an empty
judgment. No legal remedy against the premises was available. The de-
fendant's conduct was fraudulent. The significance of these factors will
be noted in other cases.
The case of Spach v. Kleb82 presents an interesting contrast to the
Jones case. In Spack, the defendant-partners had represented on their
financial reports that certain realty, on which their business was con-
ducted, was part of the partnership assets, and they secured credit on
that representation. Later, the partners sold the realty and continued the
business under a lease arrangement. They applied the proceeds of sale
to pay off the respective mortgages on their homesteads. Eleven months
later the partners filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. Thereupon,
the trustee in bankruptcy sought to impose an equitable lien on the
partners' homestead property in the amount that was applied against
the mortgage from the sale of the partnership realty. The trustee con-
tended that the creditors were defrauded by the representation of the
financial report. The lower court dismissed the trustee's complaint and
he appealed. The supreme court affirmed holding:
[T]he failure to apply proceeds from the sale of partnership
realty to the payment of creditors' claims . . . in no way sets
up a special equity in the creditors that would entitle them to
specific liens upon the assets of the partnership which had there-
tofore been divided between the partners and converted into
exempt property. 8
The court also stated that the complaint failed to charge any "bad
faith" in the sale of the property. It only charged that the failure to apply
31. Jones v. Carpenter, supra note 3, at 417, 106 So., at 130.
32. 112 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
33. Id. at 24.
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the proceeds of sale to the payment of creditors was a fraud upon the cred-
itors. Thus, the case can be distinguished from Jones. Here the financial
statement showing the realty to be a partnership asset was true at the
time; the sale of the partnership asset by the partners was an authorized
act; and only the diversion of the funds into exempt homesteads preju-
diced the creditors. It was the partners' own funds which they used to dis-
encumber their homesteads; meanwhile they remained personally liable
for debts of the partnership. Of course, personal liability is of little utility
to firm creditors if all individual assets are immune to execution and the
partners individually go through bankruptcy proceedings. Nevertheless,
there is still another important distinction from the Jones case. In Jones,
the money was taken without authority, that is stolen, from a third party,
a corporation and separate legal entity, and applied to the improvement
of the thief's homestead. Apparently then, the third party, or its creditors,
was entitled to trace the funds and impose an equitable lien in order to
obtain restitution when legal relief against the thief was inadequate be-
cause of insolvency.
A claimed lien on the homestead can also arise out of a loan of money
coupled with an oral agreement. Thus, in Craven v. Hartley,34 Mrs.
Craven purchased realty and borrowed monies from Hartley to complete
payments to the seller. The property at the time was not claimed as
homestead by Mrs. Craven. Thereafter Hartley instituted suit against
Mrs. Craven and her husband to establish an equitable lien. Hartley
alleged that Mrs. Craven orally promised to execute a mortgage in his
favor for the amount advanced for the purchase of the property. The
chancellor held in favor of an equitable lien, and the decision was per
curiam affirmed on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. 5 After the
appeal, Mrs. Craven petitioned the chancellor to adjudicate her property
a homestead and exempt from forced sale. She alleged that after institu-
tion of the original suit, but before the final decree, her husband died
and she had become a head of the household entitled to homestead bene-
fits. She further alleged that at the time of the final decree she was residing
on the affected property. The chancellor denied her petition and she
appealed. The supreme court held that an equitable lien attached once
Hartley loaned the money and she applied it to the purchase price of
the land, taking title in her name. Therefore, the property was not home-
stead at the time the lien attached. The court further stated:
The doctrine of equitable liens does not depend on written
instruments, but may arise from a variety of transactions to
which equity will attach that character. The fact that they may
be predicated on a parol agreement is not obnoxious to the
34. 102 Fla. 282, 135 So. 899 (1931).
35. Craven v. Hartley, 95 Fla. 704, 116 So. 481 (1928). This resum6 of the facts is
contained in the majority opinion of 102 Fla. 282, at 284, 135 So. 899, at 900.
1966]
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statute of frauds because they arise by operation of law from
the conduct of the parties. 6
Justice Ellis, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the Craven decision
as held by the majority stands for the following proposition:
Where one advances money to another for the purchase of
land relying upon the other's promise to pledge the land to be
acquired as security for the loan, an equitable. lien arises in
favor of the lender upon the land acquired against the borower 7
It is interesting to note that the one concurring and two dissenting opinions
each would have handled the problem differently. The concurring opinion
opined that Hartley was "subrogated" to the rights of the vendor and
therefor entitled to an equitable lien within the constitutional exception
to the homestead exemption. One dissenting opinion declared that a
married woman cannot solely pledge realty purchased by her as security
for the loan without her husband's consent, notwithstanding the home-
stead problem. Therefore, "a lender cannot legally be said to rely upon
the promise.""8 The other dissent indicated that since the decree was
entered alter the property had become homestead, the land was not subject
to forced sale.
Thus, in the Craven case, the homestead character of the land was
not in issue, since the precise holding was that the equitable lien attached
prior to the status of homestead. The lien attached as of the date on which
the conduct of the parties gave rise to it, not as of the date of the court
decree. This appears to be a sensible and just result. Summarizing, this
equitable lien, arising out of a loan of money and a promise to give
security, could be regarded as a substitute for an equitable mortgage.
The difference, if any, would appear to be negligible so far as substantive
rights are concerned. The theory of subrogation to an implied vendor's
equitable lien would likewise appear equally efficacious.
In Sonneman v. Tuszynski, 9 the plaintiff advanced money to the de-
fendant and rendered services as his housekeeper. The plaintiff had acted
in expectation that the defendant would support and maintain her for
the remainder of her life. With the assistance of proceeds contributed by
the plaintiff, the defendant purchased a tourist camp. Plaintiff assisted in
maintaining the camp until the defendant married, after which the de-
fendant and his wife made the camp their home. Later, because of certain
controversies with the plaintiff, she was forced to leave. Plaintiff, seventy-
eight years young and penniless, then instituted an action to impress an
equitable lien.
36. Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fla. 282, 286, 135 So. 899, 901 (1931).
37. Id. at 292, 135 So., at 903. This view being contra to the weight of authority.
See 1 JoNEs, LrENs § 70 (3d ed. 1914).
38. Id. at 292, 135 So., at 903.
39. 139 Fla. 824, 191 So. 18 (1939).
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The claim of lien was predicated on the defendant's promise to
support and maintain her. The Florida Supreme Court, reversing the
lower court, held that the defendant's property, which was then home-
stead, could be subjected to an equitable lien. The court based its decision
on the theory that a special equity exists in behalf of a person advancing
money, performing labor, and otherwise assisting in the accumulation of
money and property.
40
Since the money was advanced to purchase the camp, and since most
of the services were rendered prior to the marriage of the defendant and
the attachment of homestead status, the lien in Sonneman, as in Craven,
may be regarded as attaching prior to the attachment of homestead status.
It should not be concluded, however, that the existence of a homestead
status at the time of advancing money in reliance on an oral agreement
precludes the imposition of an equitable lien. In fact the contrary has
been held.4 In the most recent case dealing with this problem, the Third
District Court of Appeals succinctly set forth the criteria it regards as
necessary for the imposition of an equitable lien on homestead property.
42
"[T]o recover an equitable lien against real property used as a homestead
it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish fraud43 or 'reprehensible con-
duct.' "44 The reported decision denied the lien and gave no facts. The
cases of Jones v. Carpenter45 and Spach v. Kleb4" appear to support this
rule, while Craven v. Hartley47 and Sonneman v. Tuszynski48 are not
in point, since the lien there attached before homestead. La Mar v.
Lechlider" appears to give scant support to the statement if "fraud" was
intended in the usual sense of conscious wrongdoing.
In LaMar, the court recognizing that there was an absence of flagrant
fraud, nonetheless concluded that denial of an equitable lien would render
the homestead an instrument of fraud. In that case, the claimants added
improvements to the defendants' homestead and paid off an existing
mortgage in expectation of obtaining both an interest in the property and
a living place for their old age. There was no showing that the defendants
had not intended to perform the agreement at the time the plaintiffs were
40. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
41. LaMar v. Lechlider, 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939), discussed infra text
following note 49.
42. Clutter Constr. Corp. v. Clutter, 173 So.2d 761 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). The court
reviewed without discussion the decisions cited in the text before stating its conclusions.
43. That "flagrant fraud" is not necessary, see LaMar v. Lechlider, supra note 41.
44. 173 So.2d, at 761-62. But see Smith v. Irvine, 68 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1953), holding
that an action for damages because of fraud or misrepresentation does not give rise to an
equitable lien simply because there may not be sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment.
45. Supra note 27.
46. Supra note 32.
47. Supra note 34.
48. Supra note 39.
49. Supra note 43. The case is also discussed in text following this note, and in text
accompanying note 86 where a general basis for the lien is discussed.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
improving the realty and paying the mortgage. Hence the claim of fraud
was considerably weakened, in that the facts might well have indicated
little more than a change of mind on the part of the defendants. However,
to have not imposed the lien would have resulted in considerable benefit to,
and enrichment of, the defendants, with considerable deprivation and
inequity to the plaintiffs. To have permitted such a situation, even if in-
nocently begun, might well be regarded as toleration of fraudulent or
reprehensible conduct on the part of the defendants. Thus the conclusion
of the appellate court might appear justified; however, such a test leaves
room for considerable judicial discretion. Perhaps the only possible spe-
cific conclusion is that an equitable lien may be imposed on homestead
property when the court decides that to not do so would be too inequitable.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO THE IMPOSITION
OF THE EQUITABLE LIEN
A. Particular Relationships
1. ATTORNEY-CLIENT
There are two types of liens applicable to the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The first, a retaining lien, entitles an attorney to hold his client's
papers, money, securities and other property coming into the attorney's
possession as a result of his professional employment.5" The retaining
lien is a possessory lien and is dependent on the attorney's possession of
his client's property."' The other lien is called an "attorney's lien" or
"charging lien." This is a type of equitable lien,52 which allows the
attorney to have a lien on the judgment obtained for his client. The basis
of the lien, long recognized in Florida," is that, "[i] t is considered reason-
able and proper that an attorney, by whose labor and at whose expense
a judgment has been obtained for his client, should have an interest in
that judgment which the law will regard and protect."54
Since this paper is focused on property liens, the emphasis will be
on the acquisition of a charging lien on property recovered rather than
on liens impressed on a judgment for a sum of money. Owing to a lack of
Florida decisions on many aspects of the problem, many questions are
necessarily left unanswered.
50. See generally, 1 Joxas, LIENS §§ 113-152 (3d ed. 1914).
51. Chancey v. Bauer, 97 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1938) ; St. Ana v. Wheeler Mattison Drugs,
Inc., 129 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) ; 3 FLA. Ju". Attorneys At Law § 70 (1955).
52. See 1 JoNxs, LTENs § 155 (3d ed. 1914). "The charging lien is an equitable right ....
Chancey v. Bauer, supra note 51, at 294. Unlike some states, Florida has no statute either
creating, confirming or modifying the charging lien. St. Ana v. Wheeler Mattison Drugs, Inc.,
supra note 51. See also Note, Attorney & Client: Attorney's Charging Lien, 4 U. FLA. L.
Rav. 58, at 59 (1951).
53. Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183 (1858); Randall v. Archer, 5 Fla. 438 (1854).
54. 1 JoNrs, LIENS § 155, at 143 (3d ed. 1914).
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It will be noted that the above quotation, as well as other texts55
and some decisions,5 6 refer to the lien as being on the judgment. The
question naturally arises then as to whether a judgment is absolutely
necessary. Without examining all the possibilities of a collusive settle-
ment without the consent of the attorney," most of which have not been
litigated in Florida, the answer is clearly "no." If the settlement is made
with the approval and aid of the attorney under the supervision of the
court, the attorney may still be entitled to his lien if other circumstances
warrant it.5 Recovery is the important thing.
The lien may even be applied in favor of an attorney who has been
discharged, so long as a recovery is later obtained. Thus, in Winn v.
City of Cocoa,59 allowing a discharged attorney a lien on an award later
obtained in an eminent domain proceeding, the supreme court stated that
''an attorney who conducts a suit has a lien for his fees from the fund
recovered as long as it remains in the custody or control of the Court."6 °
In Stern v. Stern,6 the supreme court denied to the wife's attorney
in a divorce proceeding an equitable lien on her interest in formerly held
entireties property. The court reasoned that when the wife is without
funds to sustain the costs of litigation, the husband should bear the
expenses.
Somewhat in contrast to the Stern case is Robertson v. Robertson,62
55. 1 JoNES, LIENS § 153; 3 FLA. .JR. Attorneys At Law, § 71 (1955); 2 FLA. LAW &
PRACrIcE, Attorney & Client § 23 (1955); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 558 (2d ed. 1955).
56. E.g., Nichols v. Kroelinger, 46 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1950); Spethman v. Hofeldt, 141
Neb. 83, N.W.2d 620 (1942).
57. See generally on the problem Note, Attorney & Client: Attorney's Charging Lien,
4 U. FLA. L. REv. 58, 66-67 (1951) ; 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorneys At Law § 306 (1963).
58. Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958), allowing lien in
suit for alimony unconnected with divorce after reconciliation and transfer of husband's
assets to wife; Smith v. Tydings, 100 Fla. 1414, 131 So. 319 (1930), denying recovery
because of an adequate remedy at law. not because of a settlement. See also Osius v.
Hastings, infra note 59.
59. 75 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1954). In this case the landowner could have recovered attorney's
fees in the condemnation award but did not ask for them. It was held that the statutory
provision for such fees was for the benefit of the landowner and could be waived.
In Osius v. Hastings, 97 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957), it was held that when attorney
employed under a contingent fee contract was discharged before termination of the con-
troversy, attorney was not entitled to recover fee on contract or on quantum meruit before
the client recovered on claim. The attorney also was held not entitled to a retaining lien
but was entitled to an order establishing a lien upon any settlement, judgment or recovery
thereafter obtained by the client.
60. 75 So.2d 909, at 912.
61. 50 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1951). In Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 59 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1952),
also involving a claim for legal fees growing out of divorce proceedings, a lien on property
recovered for the wife was denied. The basis of the decision, although Stern v. Stern,
supra, was cited, was that the attorneys alleged a contract for legal services, a contingent
fee calling for a percentage of the sums and proloerty recovered, and the court stated that
the existence of such a contract and its terms were for the jury. Hence, the suit could
be tried at law.
62. 106 So.2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958), affirming 12 Fla. Supp. 126 (Broward Cir. Ct.
1957).
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wherein the attorney was allowed an equitable lien on the proceeds of a
property settlement which he had secured for his client in an action for
separate maintenance (alimony unconnected with divorce). The trial
court stated:
Under the circumstances the court finds that there was
an implied understanding between the attorney and client that
a reasonable fee would be charged, and would of necessity be
payable out of the property realized from the settlement.6"
The cases of Stern and Robertson may be reconciled or distinguished
in a number of ways. Since the Court spoke of the necessity of an agree-
ment in Stern,64 it may be that there was no agreement for a lien between
the attorney and client in that case, as there was found to be in Robert-
son. Further, in Stern the property involved was formerly held in the en-
tireties. This was property which the divorced spouse already owned,
the effect of the divorce being merely to change her interest from a
tenancy by the entireties to a tenancy in common. Thus, in a sense, the
attorney did not recover the property for her in the divorce proceeding.
In Robertson, on the other hand, the attorney did recover, from the
husband, property for his client. In fact, the attorney recovered all of the
husband's property, "stripped him clean," and thus made it impossible
for the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees. 5
The general basis for the attorney's equitable lien is an agreement,
express or implied, between the attorney and client that certain funds
or property recovered on behalf of the client will be used to pay the
attorney's fee.66 This basis of the lien was reaffirmed in 1958 and 1959 by
both the Second District Court of Appeal 7 and the Florida Supreme
Court" in the case of Billingham v. Thiele. This case, denying a lien in
the controversy in litigation, overruled one,69 and reconciled7" another,
earlier supreme court case dealing with similar situations.
63. 12 Fla. Supp., at 128. The conclusion of the chancellor as to an implied agreement
was affirmed on appeal. 106 So.2d, at 592. The finding of an implied agreement is inter-
esting in view of the fact that the original agreement between the attorney and client was
that the lawyer would be paid a reasonable fee to be determined by the court and that the
fee would be assessed against the husband. However, under the terms of the settlement,
reconciliation and dismissal of the suit, all of the husband's property was turned over to
the wife. Thus, payment by the husband was impossible. This was known to the wife who
had to give him money so that he could leave town. Hence she must have realized that
her attorney would have to be paid out of the property acquired from the settlement.
64. Stern v. Stern, supra note 61, at 120.
65. See the two reports, supra note 62; the delineated facts supra note 63.
66. Robertson v. Robertson, supra note 62; Billingham v. Thiele, infra notes 67, 68,
and cases cited therein.
67. 107 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
68. 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959).
69. Ward v. Forde, 154 Fla. 383, 17 So.2d 691 (1944). The district court of appeal
could not reconcile this case, and the supreme court overruled it. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
70. See, however, the discussion of Smith v. Tydings, infra, text following note 72.
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In Bilingham the attorney had been successful in getting certain
ninety-nine year leases and agreements cancelled on his clients' property.
Then, alleging an agreement for lien with the clients, the attorney sought
to establish a lien on the property which was discharged on the outstand-
ing leases. The lien was denied on the basis of a lack of agreement for
such a lien, as the plaintiff admitted in his testimony that there was no
such agreement."' The earlier cases reviewed by the court should be con-
sidered along with their interpretation in Billingham.
In Smith v. Tydings, 2 one of the cases reviewed, the plaintiff sought
an equitable lien on his client's property after the litigation had been
settled, and the attorney remained unpaid. The supreme court in that
case, without further explanation, affirmed the lower court's decision that
there was an adequate remedy at law. In Billingham the district court
had remarked that "we must take this decision as being under the majority
rule, 7 3 and stated the majority rule:
[Where] there is no express or implied agreement with a client
regarding. a lien for his services, or where there is no special
equity set forth or any property in court or in the attorney's
hand, the lien will not be allowed.74
It is submitted that Billingham v. Thiele,7 5 does not satisfactorily
explain Smith v. Tydings.78 Billingham only explains the dismissal of
Smith: "[T]he bill of complaint showed that the plaintiff had an adequate
remedy at law in having said that the bill contained an agreement between
the client and his attorney that the attorney should recover for his fees
out of the land involved. 77 In addition to the fact that the reported
Smith case says nothing about an agreement, the Billingham case proceeds
to reconcile the cases on the presence or absence of an agreement. If the
Smith bill did allege an agreement, as the court stated, it would appear
that the attorney, on proof thereof, should have had a lien under the law
as expounded in Billingham; yet the court held just the opposite. The
apparent contradiction is confusing, and especially since it appears to
have escaped the Billingham courts.78
In the case of Alyea v. Hampton79 the court found that there was a
71. 107 So.2d., at 244. The written contract, 107 So.2d, at 239, only provided for prora-
tion of expenses among the unit owners on a unit basis without providing for any lien
or charge on the realty or unit.
72. 100 Fla. 1414, 131 So. 319 (1930).
73. 107 So.2d 238, at 242.
74. Id. at 244.
75. 107 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958); cert. denied, 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959).
76. Supra note 72.
77. 107 So.2d 238, at 241.
78. 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959). The supreme court in discharging the writ of certiorari
did not mention Smith v. Tydings, but seemed satisfied generally with the district court's
rationalization of the cases and accordingly "receded from" Ward v. Forde, infra note 85.
79. 112 Fla. 61, 150 So. 242 (1933).
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definite agreement between the attorney and client, and thus allowed
an equitable lien on the property recovered. In Scott v. Kirtley," the
Florida Supreme Court, although there was apparently no express agree-
ment for lien, nonetheless allowed the attorney an equitable lien. The
court there held that since the client told the attorney that she was with-
out funds and unable to pay a retainer or other fee at the time she engaged
him, that an equitable lien may be implied and declared "upon the funda-
mental maxim of equity that no one shall be unjustly enriched at another's
expense .... 181 Somewhat in contrast to the Scott case is Guthrie v.
Home Bldg. & Loan Co. 2 In this case, the Florida Supreme Court held
that an attorney who foreclosed certain mortgages and secured the prop-
erty thereunder for his client, did not have an equitable lien on the
property recovered.
The Billingham case reconciled Scott and Guthrie as follows:
As we see it the Guthrie case does not override the Scott case,
but it can be distinguished. The Guthrie case held that the at-
torney had no lien for his fees [sic] which his client acquired
by reason of the attorney's services in the foreclosure proceed-
ings absent the arrangement or agreement that he would have a
lien whereas in the Scott case the attorney had, in view of all
the facts, an understanding that his services would be payable
out of what the client should realize as a result of the successful
efforts of the attorney. 3
This reconciliation, on the basis of an implied agreement in Scott, appears
justified and presents no particular difficulty. The Scott decision was
followed in Knabb v. Mabry, 4 wherein attorneys were granted a lien
on the property recovered in a foreclosure decree. The court felt that the
circumstances were such that the defendant would be unjustly enriched
at the attorneys' expense. Moreover there was an understanding between
the parties that the attorneys would be paid out of the proceeds recovered
for the client.
In Ward v. Forde85 the attorneys had obtained an agreement to be
paid a fee without mention of any security to be given to them. As a
matter of fact, part of the fees were paid, in cash, by the defendants.
Nevertheless, the attorneys sought an equitable lien for the balance due,
and the court allowed the lien on the basis that it was equitable and just
to do so.
80. 113 Fla. 637, 152 So. 721 (1934).
81. Id. at 642 ; 152 So., at 723.
82. 116 Fla. 822, 156 So. 882 (1934).
83. Supra note 77, at 241 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). The Florida Supreme Court agreed with
this reconciliation, 109 So.2d 763 (Fla. 1959).
84. 137 Fla. 530, 188 So. 586 (1939).
85. 154 Fla. 383, 17 So.2d 691 (1944). The suit in this case involved the removal




The Ward case proved irreconcilable on the issue of whether or not there
was an agreement for lien between the attorney and client. Accordingly,
The Supreme Court of Florida in Billingham receded from Ward and
stated the Florida position:
[I]n the absence of statutory authority, or an express contract
or an implied agreement arising out of special equitable circum-
stances, an attorney is not entitled to the imposition of a charg-
ing lien on the real estate of his client.8
In Greenfield Villages, Inc. v. Thompson17 it was held that the
attorneys were entitled to an equitable lien on the basis of a special agree-
ment between the attorneys and the client. The agreement was that the
fees were to be paid out of funds received from the sale of certain
properties.
Cases concerning probate or the administration of decedents' estates
are worthy of consideration. In the early case of Fuller v. Cason8" an
attorney, claiming a lien, sought to enjoin his client from disposing of
certain cattle which he obtained for her by establishing a nuncupative
will. The Florida Supreme Court found that no lien attached for his
services in establishing the will because the property vested in the ad-
ministrator, not in the defendant. Therefore, the legatee had no such
interest that would enable a lien to attach. The decision appears unduly
technical. Title to the property, although lodging temporarily in the ad-
ministrator en route, either had vested or ultimately would vest in the
client. The method of asserting the lien may be questioned. Instead of
enjoining the sale, perhaps the attorney should have brought a bill in
equity to impress a lien on the cattle and had them sold to satisfy
his claim.89 Nonetheless, the rule that an attorney may impress a charging
lien for services rendered in probate matters has been recognized by the
Supreme Court of Florida. In In re Warner's Estate0 the probate court
was allowed to establish an equitable lien on a legatee's share in an estate
for the amount of the services rendered by the attorney. The lien was
enforced by directing the executors to withhold the amount of the fees
from the legacy payable to the client. The client was a non-resident and
his share of the estate was about to be transferred to an out-of-state bank.
The Warner case was later followed in In re Barker's Estate,"' which
also allowed the probate court to impress a lien for legal fees upon a
client's share of an estate. In this case there was a contract that the
attorneys would receive a certain percentage of the legatee's share in
86. 109 So.2d 763, 764 (Fla. 1959).
87. 44 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1950).
88. 26 Fla. 476, 7 So. 870 (1890).
89. See infra notes 90 & 91; Note, 4 U. FLA. L. Rav. 58, at 64-65 (1951).
90. 160 Fla. 460, 35 So.2d 296 (1948). See 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 445 (1948).
91. 75 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1954). Scott v. Kirtley, supra note 80, authorized a lien for the
attorney who secured for his client a child's portion of an estate.
1966]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
return for their services. Thus, the case is in accord with the precedent
which predicates the lien on a contract. However, the client disputed the
attorneys' position concerning the contract, and the dissent92 would have
denied the lien on the basis that the County Judge's Court should have
such jurisdiction only if there is no dispute as to the contract itself, its
validity, or its terms providing for the attorney to be paid from the pro-
ceeds of the recovery.
Nichols v. Kroelinger,93 also involving a decedent's estate, presents
interesting questions of proper remedy, waiver, laches and statute of
limitations. In this case the attorney had secured a judgment for his client
which included attorney's fees. This judgment lay dormant for a total of
eighteen years which was five years after the death of the client. At that
time, since the estate had never been administered, the attorney attempted
to have an administrator appointed to collect his fees. The court stated
that any relief which the attorney may have had against his deceased
client's estate was barred by the three year statute of limitations.94
Accordingly, he could not have an administrator appointed against the
consent of the client's widow. The court indicated, however, that the
attorney might still proceed against the judgment to satisfy his charging
lien. In this manner, the court apparently sanctioned survival of the
remedy, assuming that the judgment was still enforceable," after the
statute of limitations had run on a claim for personal liability against
the client. It is to be noted, however, that the court also spoke about the
necessity for diligence, indicating that in some cases the lien, otherwise
applicable, may be lost by waiver or laches.
2. BROKER-VENDOR-PURCHASER
Broker contracts are contracts for personal services and are gen-
erally regarded as fully remedial at law.9 However, a few unusual cases
have arisen in Florida, wherein brokers have sought to impose an equitable
lien on property whose sale they negotiated. From the scant authority
available, it appears that the broker will be successful in impressing such
a lien only if he can qualify as a third person entitled to a vendor's lien. 7
In Moss v. Sperry,9" the broker alleged that the property was sold
through his efforts, and, that by agreement with the vendor, the broker
92. Id. at 304.
93. 46 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1950).
94. FLA. STAT. § 734.29(1) (1963), barring claims after three years from the death
of a person whose estate has not been administered.
95. FLA. STAT. § 55.081 (1965), provides a twenty-year statute of limitations on
judgment liens.
96. Boyd v. Hunter, 104 Fla. 561, 140 So. 666 (1932) ; Levitt v. Axelson, 102 Fla. 233,
135 So. 553 (1931); King v. Wells, 100 Fla. 588, 130 So. 38 (1930).
97. See infra text following note 105 & 108.
98. 140 Fla. 301, 191 So. 531 (1939).
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was to receive his commission from the proceeds of sale. It was further
alleged that the vendor and purchaser were fraudulently conspiring to
avoid his commission, and, that since the vendor was a non-resident, the
broker could not obtain personal service in order to obtain a judgment
at law against him. In addition, the land was now subject to an enforce-
able executory contract to convey, so that the vendor, although still
holding legal title, had no beneficial interest subject to attachment. The
vendor likewise had no title to other property within the jurisdiction
subject to attachment. Hence, the broker's legal remedy was inadequate.
Nonetheless the Supreme Court of Florida found no basis for the
imposition of a vendor's lien or an equitable lien as distinct from a
vendor's lien, but reversed the trial court's dismissal on the basis that
the broker was entitled to pursue the remedy of equitable attachmentY9
The court noted that the vendor would be entitled to no lien under the
circumstances, and, therefore, found no basis for according a lien to the
broker. Under the usual brokerage arrangement, the purchaser is entitled
to pay all the purchase price to the vendor without regard to whether the
vendor pays the broker. The broker's contract is with the vendor and is
one for money only. After the sale, title vests in the vendee and the
broker is not entitled to a lien. However, if the purchaser is obligated by
agreement with the vendor to pay the broker's commission, then the
broker is entitled to a lien of the vendor to the extent of the commission
owing. 00
The broker was unable to resort to a remedy of garnishment because
that remedy applied only to debts actually due, and in Moss the debt to
the broker was to become due only if the sale was actually consummated.
The court then noted that the remedy of attachment was broader, but
doubted whether it would lie where the obligation was contingent, as in the
case under discussion. Noting that allegations of fraud warranted equit-
able jurisdiction, the court concluded that equitable attachment would
lie to compel the payment of the broker's commission if the sale was
consummated and the proceeds realized. The attachment would be dis-
solved when the debt was paid or when it became clear that the sale would
not be consummated. 10'
Nicol v. Bressler,"°2 involved facts similar to the Moss case except
that title had already been transferred to the purchaser. The broker
alleged that the property had been sold through his efforts, and that the
vendor and vendee had fraudulently conspired to cheat him out of his
commission. His claim for lien was denied. Justice Barns, speaking for
99. Ibid.
100. See also Winston v. Ahlman, infra note 105.
101. Moss v. Sperry, supra note 98, at 540. See also 3 FA. JUR. Attachment & Gar-
nishment § 10 (1955), for a discussion of equitable attachment.
102. 159 Fla. 668, 32 So.2d 457 (1948).
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the majority of the supreme court, held: "If the transaction between the
buyer and seller had been completed with the broker looking on he could
not have prevented it and his claim would have been the same as it is
now . . . a claim for compensation against the party with whom he
contracted-to-wit: the vending owner."'13 Justice Adams, dissenting,
felt that the remedy at law was neither clear nor adequate, found no
previous case exactly like this one, and apparently thought an equitable
lien should lie. He noted: "Petitioner performed his duty; the purchaser
became a party to the fraud, received the property and gained that which
rightfully belonged to the petitioner."'1 4
Since it did not appear that the plaintiff-broker alleged the defen-
dant's insolvency, or other circumstances suggesting the inability of ob-
taining or collecting a money judgment against either the vendee or the
vendor, the inadequacy of the legal remedy was not apparent. Thus,
denial of an equitable lien would appear proper.
The most recent case dealing with this problem, Winston ;v.
Aklman,"'0 allowed the broker to enforce a vendor's lien and is consistent
with the theory of the cases previously discussed. The court there held
that when part of the consideration for the purchase price of the property
"is the assumption and payment by the purchaser of an indebtedness
owing by the vendor to a third party, the latter may enforce a vendor's
lien for the amount of the claim." 0 The true vendor's lien is raised on
behalf of the vendor as security for payment of the purchase price when
no security is expressly retained.'07 When part of the purchase price is
the assumption of an obligation of the vendor, as, for example, the pay-
ment of a broker's commission, the vendor's obligee (in this case, the
broker) is entitled to enforce a vendor's lien to the extent of the obliga-
tion. The position of the third party or broker is similar to that of a
subrogee of the vendor's lien. 08
3. IMPROVER-OWNER
Frequently improvers of real estate who would be entitled to a me-
chanics' or other statutory lien do not obtain such a lien because of
failure to comply with statutory requirements. The circumstances under
which such persons may be able to obtain an equitable lien is the subject
matter of this section. For convenience, the cases are discussed under two
103. Id. at 669, 32 So.2d, at 457.
104. Id. at 669-670, 32 So.2d, at 458.
105. 131 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
106. Id. at 488.
107. See Boyer & Evans, The Vendor's Lien, 20 U. MIAmI L. Rlv. 767 (1966).
108. Id. at 773. The true vendor's lien is held not assignable. Therefore, it is probably
more correct to refer to the third party, in this case the broker, as acquiring a vendor's lien




categories: (1) those where the claimant failed to comply with the
Mechanics' Lien Law; and (2) those where the claimant failed to satisfy
the requirements of another statutory lien.
a. Failure to Comply with the Mechanics' Lien Law
The period of time covered by the cases under review, starting in
1893, witnessed many changes in the statutory law providing for me-
chanics' liens. No attempt is herein made to delineate the history of the
Florida Mechanics' Lien Law,losa nor to set forth the requirements under
such law at any particular time. The cases reviewed will merely indicate,
as far as possible, why the particular claimant did not obtain a mechanic's
lien at the time, and will reflect whether or not he was successful in
obtaining an equitable lien. Although comparisons with the statutory
requirements, then and now, will frequently be made, the purpose is
not to explain the intricacies of the Mechanics' Lien Law. Instead, the
purpose of this section is to attempt to find under what circumstances a
claimant failing to qualify for a lien under the statute may be entitled to
an equitable lien.
The first case to be considered, Lockett v. Robinson,'0 9 decided by the
supreme court in 1893, involved the claim of a supplier of materials who
apparently had contracted directly with the owner. The owner of the
property, in financial difficulty, was forced to make an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. Three days after the assigment, but within the
time allowed under the statute, the plaintiff filed a notice of intention to
claim a lien."' Upon suit by the assignee for creditors to enjoin the
claimant from enforcing his lien on the land, a consent decree was entered
wherein the property was to be sold and the proceeds deposited in a
bank until the plaintiff's lien rights were adjudicated. The plaintiff then
sought to impress an equitable lien on the proceeds of sale, and the
supreme court reversed the trial court's dismissal and upheld the
plaintiff's claim. The court held that the plaintiff could have a lien on
the funds because the remedy afforded by the Mechanics' Lien Law
108a. FLA. STAT. ch. 84 (1965).
109. 31 Fla. 134, 12 So. 649 (1893).
110. It is not clear whether he filed a notice of intention to claim a lien or simply a
claim of lien. Fla. Laws 1868, ch. 1632, as amended by Fla. Laws 1877, ch. 3042, had
requirements for non-privity lienors to file a notice of intention to claim a lien and also
requirements for filing a claim of lien. If the claimant did contract directly with the owner,
as he alleged, it is likely that it was the claim of lien that he filed. Under the so-called
UwN'voRm MEcHlNics' LIEN LAW, in Florida from 1935 to 1963, lienors in privity were
not even required to file a claim of lien. Hendry Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 138 Fla. 485, 189
So. 710 (1939). The notice to owner requirements of the present act are found in FLA. STAT.
§ 84.061(2) (1965), and discussed in 2 BoYER at § 33.09 (1966), wherein a comparison
is also made with the provisions of the act in effect prior to 1963. The claim of lien re-
quirements under the present act are found in FLA. STAT. § 84.081 (1965), and discussed
in 2 Bov'a, at § 33.14, where a comparison is also made with the provisions in effect under
the so-called Uniform Act.
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could not furnish relief under the peculiar circumstances of the case."1
It was also held that since the notice of lien was timely filed, the lien
was effective against the assignee, although he had no notice of the
plaintiff's rights until after delivery of the assignment. The decision was
certainly just. When the parties agree to substituted security, they ought
to be bound by the agreement. Further, an assignee normally gets no
greater rights than his assignor, and even a purchaser without notice
within the period of grace for filing liens takes subject to liens under the
mechanics' lien provisions." 2 It should also be noted that current statutes
have provisions for substituted security."
5
In Palmer v. Edwards, "4 the plaintiff contracted to build a building
for Edwards. Edwards had represented that a certain corporation owned
the property, but this was not true as Edwards and his wife were the
owners. The plaintiff completed construction in February and received
payments until May when there was a balance of twenty-four hundred
dollars owing. In November, Edwards sold the property to Stoll. Upon
learning of the sale to Stoll, the plaintiff instituted an action for a
declaratory decree, and, alleging insolvency of the Edwards, sought
whatever equitable relief the court would give. The supreme court con-
cluded, in a four to three decision, that the prayer for a declaratory
judgment was superfluous, but held that although the plaintiff could have
proceeded under the Mechanics' Lien Law, he was not limited to that
procedure in this case. Accordingly the plaintiff was held entitled to an
equitable lien under the doctrine announced in Jones v. Carpenter."' The
lien was impressed on the fund owing by purchaser Stoll to the Edwards.
The court concluded by stating, "One should not be barred from pressing
a just claim if the law provides any means for him to do so.""'
Several factors in the Edwards case are worth noting. The plaintiff
had not filed a claim of lien, but this was unnecessary under the law then
in effect as to lienors under a direct contract with the owner." 7 Suit was
brought within a year after completion of the work, and thus was within
the time limit allowed for lienors in privity to enforce their liens.""
However, under the law then in effect, lienors in privity who did not file
111. Lockett v. Robinson, supra note 109. The case pointed out that at the time pro-
ceeds from the sale of land were not reachable directly by process except in equity.
112. See generally 2 BOYER, at § 33.17(2), where it is pointed out that the likelihood
of unsuspected liens valid against a purchaser is lessened under the 1963 act.
113. FLA. STAT. § 84.241 (1965).
114. 51 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1951).
115. 90 Fla. 407, 106 So. 127 (1925).
116. Palmer v. Edwards, 51 So.2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1951).
117. FLA. STAT. § 84.14 (1961), repealed; Hendry Lumber Co. v. Bryant, 138 Fla. 485,
189 So. 710 (1939); Broderick v. Overhead Door Co., 117 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
Under the present statute, every lienor is obligated to record a claim of lien in order to
perfect a lien. FLA. STAT. § 84.081 (1965).
118. Hendry Lumber Co. v. Bryant, supra note 117; see FiA. STAT. § 84.21 (1961),
repealed, as to the one-year statute of limitations on enforcement.
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a claim of lien within the grace period after completion of the work were
susceptible of losing their lien, if the property were sold to a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice."" The sale to Stoll was within the
year, but beyond the grace period for filing claims;' 2 however, the case
does not specify whether or not Stoll was a bona fide purchaser. Further,
the lien imposed was not a mechanics' lien on the property, but an
equitable lien on the proceeds owing from the sale. In short, it appears
that the plaintiff made no effort whatsoever to impress a mechanics' lien
on the land itself. Instead, he relied, at first, upon his contract rights for
payment, and then, after sale, sought and obtained an equitable lien
against the proceeds owing the vendor.
Under the facts, no one seemed to be prejudiced by the imposition
of the lien, and no valid reason appeared for not imposing it. The
purchaser, Stoll, paid no more for the land than he agreed to pay and
he got the property unencumbered by a mechanics' lien. Other creditors
of Edwards were not shown to be prejudiced by plaintiff's preferential
claim on the sales proceeds, since he could have acquired such pref-
erence by impressing a lien against the land, and the time for impressing
such a lien as against Edwards had not yet run. The plaintiff, since he
had not proceeded under the Mechanics' Lien Law and then neglected
to carry through, could not be held to be estopped on any theory of
election of remedies or equitable estoppel by virtue of inducing others
to rely on the position he had taken.
Lewinson v. Shaw," 1 illustrates the significance of the adequacy of the
legal remedy. After construction of an apartment building, the owners and
builder entered into an agreement whereby the builder would be paid
from the proceeds of a mortgage which the owners were going to place
on the property, if the builder would not file a mechanics' lien. Relying
on this agreement, the builder refrained from filing a lien and then assigned
the owners' note to the plaintiff. The defendant-owners did place a mort-
gage on the property, but refused to pay the indebtedness by then acquired
by the plaintiff. In a suit to establish an equitable lien, the lower court
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The supreme court, in
upholding the dismissal, stated that the dismissal should have been with
leave to amend the complaint. The court held that the complaint in the
instant case lacked an essential element which was present in both Jones
and Palmer, namely insolvency of the defendant.
In Lewinson the court predicated its decision on the failure of the
plaintiff to allege the insolvency of the defendants. The court did not
119. Nathman v. Chrycy, 107 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959). The grace period for filing
the claim was three months after the final performance of the labor or services or the final
furnishing of materials.
120. As the text indicates, plaintiff had completed construction in February, and
Edwards sold the property to Stoll in November of the same year.
,121. 56 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1952).
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appear to place any significance on the possibility or probability of the
plaintiff (or his predecessor) having waived the right to a mechanics' lien
by taking a note and thus electing not to proceed under the lien statute.
As a practical matter, the conduct of the lien claimants in Lewinson and
Palmer do not seem materially different in respect to their failure to
attempt to enforce a statutory mechanics' lien. In neither case did the
plaintiff make any effort to perfect a lien under the statute. Hence, it
appears that failure of the claimant to proceed under the statute, or to
make any effort at all to perfect a lien thereunder, does not, by itself,
preclude him from establishing an equitable lien. Other circumstances
may nonetheless warrant such a lien, i.e., the inadequacy of the legal
remedy. In the Lewinson case, if the owners were not insolvent, there
would appear to have been no reason why the still available legal remedy
of suit on the note, judgment and execution against property still owned
by the defendants (the apartment building subject to the mortgage and
presumably the proceeds of the mortgage), was not a complete and
adequate legal remedy.
Inadequacy of the legal remedy because of contractual incapacity was
the basis for the imposition of an equitable lien in Ross v. Gerung,22
wherein church officials had entered into a contract for certain im-
provements to the church property. After completion of the improve-
ments and failure of the church to pay, the plaintiff successfully sought
an equitable lien upon the property of the unincorporated association.
The supreme court held that since an unincorporated association could
not be held liable for its contracts at law, 23 the remedy of a mechanic's
lien, which is predicated on a contract for the improvement of real
estate, 24 was not available to the plaintiff in the absence of a contract
binding on the association.' 25 Therefore there was no adequate remedy
available to the plaintiff, and the property of the association could be
subjected to an equitable lien, where there was no personal judgment,
sought against the association. 26
In contrast to the previous cases are those where claimants have
been denied an equitable lien because of their failure to pursue successfully
the remedy provided by the Mechanics' Lien Law. In Kimbrell v. Fink,27
two years after filing a claim of lien, the plaintiff sought an equitable lien.
122. 69 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
123. See Henry Pilcher's Sons, Inc. v. Martin, 102 Fla. 672, 136 So. 386 (1931), which
was cited by the supreme court.
124. This is true under both the present act and its immediate predecessor. See 2
BOYER, at § 33.04(1) (1966).
125. Cf., however, arising under an even earlier act, Chapman v. Stephens Protestant
Episcopal Church, 105 Fla. 683, 136 So. 238 (1931), motion granted 105 Fla. 683, 138 So.
630 (1932), rehearing granted 105 Fla. 683, 139 So. 188 (1932), modified on other grounds,
105 Fla. 683, 145 So. 757 (1933).
126. Ross v. Gerung, supra note 122.
127. 78 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1955).
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Of course, at this time he had lost his right to foreclose the statutory
lien.' ' As an additional basis for the intervention of equity the plaintiff
alleged misrepresentations as to the ownership of the property at the
time the contract was entered into, and acquiescence by the owner in
the completion of the improvements. The supreme court held that the
claimant was not entitled to an equitable lien. When the law creates both
a right and a remedy, any limitations on the remedy are treated as limita-
tions on the right.'29 Thus, since the plaintiff had lost his remedy by a
built-in statute of limitations, he also lost the right to his lien. The court
also found that the claimant had suffered no injury as a result of the
misrepresentations about the ownership of the property, and that the
claimant had had a right to a mechanic's lien which he lost through his
own inaction by not foreclosing the lien in time. 3°
In the Kimbrell case the claimant had undertaken to comply
with the Mechanics' Lien Law, and his own neglect and lack of dili-
gence resulted in the loss of his statutory lien. In the other cases so
far considered where an equitable lien was impressed, the claimant made
no attempt to comply with the provisions of the statutory lien, and
secondly, and perhaps more important, he sought the remedy of an
equitable lien at a time when relief under the statute would have been
available had he sought relief thereunder.
Quite similar to the Kimbrell case is Blanton v. Young."' This
case also held that a contractor who had timely filed his claim of lien,
but failed to institute foreclosure proceedings within the one-year period,
was not entitled to an equitable lien. Thus, it appears fairly well estab-
lished that, in the absence of misrepresentation or other wrongdoing on
behalf of the owner inducing inaction, the claimant is not entitled to an
equitable lien when he fails to foreclose a mechanics' lien within the
period allowed."'
In 0. HI. Thomason Builders' Supplies, Inc. v. Goodwin,"' the
plaintiff-materialman failed to file a notice of lien within the prescribed
time, but alleged institution of foreclosure proceedings within twelve
months from the time he filed such notice."' The relief sought was either
128. FLA. STAT. . 84.21 (1961), repealed. The one year period of limitations is the same
under the present act. FLA. STAT. § 84.221(1) (1965).
129. Kimbrell v. Fink, supra note 127.
130. The owner could or would have been liable for the imposition of a lien on his
property on the basis that he contracted for the improvements by an agent, his son-in-law,
or that he was estopped by his conduct to deny that the son-in-law was his agent.
131. 80 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1955).
132. Accord, Rood Co. v. Luber, 91 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1956); Wood v. Wilson, 84
So.2d 32 (Fla. 1956).
133. 152 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
134. The case uses the phrase notice of lien twice but it is not clear just what is meant
by this phrase. Under the lien law then in effect, lienors in privity (apparently applicable
to the plaintiff) were entitled to file a claim of lien but did not have to do so if foreclosure
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a mechanic's or equitable lien on the improved property. The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, apparently agreeing with the trial court, that the
plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements for a mechanic's lien,18'
held that the plaintiff failed to allege and state any grounds entitling
him to an equitable lien. The court did agree, however:
There is no question, then, of the right of a person furnish-
ing services or materials in the improvement of realty to seek
an equitable lien thereon as security for the debt, even though
he may not have complied with the requirements under the
mechanic's lien laws of this state. To establish such equitable
lien, however, he must allege and prove his entitlement to this
lien within certain principles recognized by the courts.l"e
It was then noted that equitable liens may arise from two sources, either:
(1) a written contract showing an intention to charge some particular
property with a debt or obligation: or (2) declaration by a court out of
general considerations of right and justice." 7 Since there was no allegation
of a written contract showing an intent to imnose a lien, the circumstances
were reviewed to see if a lien should have been declared out of general
eouitable considerations. It was concluded that such a lien should not
be declared for a number of reasons. For one thing, an eouitable lien is
veneraliv not raised against a bona fide nurchaser without notice. and
the comtlaint did not negative the possibility of such Durchaser. Other
deficiencies were also revealed. There were no allecations t~hat one of
the defendants was an owner of any of the lots at the time he mprde n
agreement to purchase the materials, or even that he had ever been n
owner. Nor were there allegations that any of the defendants were mi;lr
of any wrongdoings or misrepresentations on which the plaintiff relied
to his disadvantage.
Although it is often stated that an equitable lien may be established
where there is a written contract which shows an intention to charge
some particular Dronertv with an obligation,"s few, if any, of the cases
proceedings were instituted within one year after completion of services or surmlying of
materials. Non-privity lienors were authorized to file a notice of intention to claim a lien,
often called a cautionary notice under the former statute, but there would be no reason for
lienors in rOrivitv to file quch a notice. See supra note 110 and text following note 116. Also
under the statute then in effect, it was necessary on foreclosing a lien to file a notice of
Hs pendens. Trushin v. Brown, 132 So.2d 357 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961): Stern v. Perma-stress.
Inc., 134 So.2d .509 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961). See also Phelps v. T. 0. Mahaffey. Inc.. infra
note 144. Probably what is meant by the statement is that the claimant did not file a cl,,im
of lien, and on attempting to foreclose a lien, he failed to file a notice of lis pendens within
the year's time.
135. The trial court held that plaintiff's notice of lien did not meet the requirements
of the law. and that the foreclosure notice was not filed within the time allowed by law.
136. 152 So.2d 797, 799 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1963).
137. Id. at 800. See aLso supra text accomnanying note 19; infra text following note 159.
These bases of an equitable lien are frequently recited in the cases.
138. 1 Joxts, LiENs 27 (3d ed. 1914); see dicta in Tones v. Camenter. 90 Fla. 407,
106 So. 127 (1925); 0. H. Thomason Builders' Supplies, Inc., supra note 133.
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herein considered imposed a lien on that basis. Thus, in Tucker v. Prevatt
Builders, Inc.,'89 there was a written contract for improvements, per-
formance by the plaintiff, insolvency of the owner, an assignment for
creditors, a claim of lien by the plaintiff, and transferees with notice of
the plaintiff's claim. It should be noted that the builder-claimant orally
insisted upon a claim of lien when the owner was having his difficulties.
Hence the probable basis of the lien was a general consideration of right
and justice. In any event, an equitable lien was allowed although the
court did not say expressly why a mechanics' lien could not be obtained.
Probably the claimant did not record a claim of lien or make any overt
effort to comply with the statute.
A case often cited as a classic example for the possible imposition
of an equitable lien is Green v. Putnam.140 In this case the plaintiff and
defendant orally agreed for the joint development of certain property
with a sharing of the profits derived from its contemplated sale. The
parties also agreed that there would be a written partnership agreement,
and work was commenced with the plaintiff supervising the construction.
Later, the plaintiff refused to proceed until the partnership agreement
was executed. On the defendant's refusal, the plaintiff filed a notice of
lien. The Florida Supreme Court held that assuming, but not deciding,
that there was no valid mechanic's lien established, 4' the facts of this
case "may well be a classic example where equity may intervene to im-
press a lien to prevent inequity or unjust enrichment of one party as
against another." 42
In the case of Armstrong v. Blackadar,43 the plaintiff had contracted
with the owner's son to make certain repairs to a dwelling damaged by
fire. The plaintiff was under the impression that the son was the owner,
but the owner, who spoke little English, saw the plaintiff make the
repairs and even remarked on what a good job the plaintiff was doing.
Unknown to the plaintiff, there was an unrecorded contract for sale be-
tween the owner and the defendants. Two weeks after completion of the
work, the purchasers moved onto the premises. The plaintiff immediately
139. 116 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
140. 93 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1957).
141. 'he trial court had held that there was a profit-sharing joint enterprise and such
relationship is inconsistent with the existence of a mechanic's lien. Accordingly, it dismissed
the complaint. The trial court had found that the defendant was in exclusive management
and control and that there was no provision for sharing losses. The supreme court held
that the chancellor was in error on his concept of a joint venture, and that mutual control
and an intention to share losses are essential characteristics of a joint venture. Accordingly,
the decision was reversed.
142. 93 So.2d, at 380. It is to be noted that the case does not hold that an equitable
lien is in fact to be impressed in the instant case. It simply says that if a mechanic's lien
cannot be imposed, perhaps an equitable lien may be. There was no showing or allegation
of insolvency on the part of the defendant, fraud or other unconscionable conduct, or
circumstances suggesting that a judgment and execution would prove to be an inadequate
remedy.
143. 118 So.2d 854 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
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filed his notice of lien and had it served upon the defendant-purchasers.
The Second District Court of Appeal held that the son was the father's
agent, and thus a mechanics' lien would lie. However, it also held that,
assuming that the plaintiff had no right to a mechanic's lien, he would
be clearly entitled to an equitable lien. The basis for this assertion was
that both the owner and the purchasers knew that the fire damage had to
be repaired and that the owner was obligated by contract to repair those
damages. The purchasers even saw the plaintiff make the improvements.
Since the owner was obligated by contract to make the repairs, the pur-
chasers had no cause to complain about the imposition of an equitable lien
on the property now in their possession. Apparently the only basis for
the imposition of an equitable lien was that the defendant-purchasers
should be estopped from defending against a lien because they knew of
and did not object to the improvements being made. This appears to be
an extension, perhaps an unwarranted one, of the Florida decisions deline-
ating the grounds for the imposition of an equitable lien when a statutory
lien is also available. There was no allegation mentioned as to insolvency
of the owner or any other reason for rendering inadequate the remedy
at law. Of course, the statement as to an equitable lien may be regarded
as dictum since the court did say that a mechanic's lien would lie. If the
plaintiff had proceeded timely under the Mechanics' Lien Law, and that
remedy were not barred, there would seem to be no need for resorting to
an equitable lien.
In Phelps v. T. 0. Mahaffey, Inc.,' the plaintiff was contacted by
Mahaffey who introduced him to a Mr. Ruke and explained that they
were desirous of paving certain property. Mahaffey told the plaintiff and
Ruke to talk it over, and that whatever settlement they reached was up
to them. Ruke and the plaintiff came to an agreement and the plaintiff
commenced work. During the progress of the work, the plaintiff became
concerned about who was to pay for the work. He was told by Mahaffey
that if he had been told to go ahead, then he, Mahaffey, would stand be-
hind Ruke and would take care of everything. Upon partial completion
of the work, a bill was submitted to Mahaffey who stated that he would
pay only one-sixth of the bill. Ruke refused to pay any part of it. Mahaffey
submitted one-half the amount on condition that he be paid back when
Ruke paid the bill. It was admitted by the plaintiff that Ruke never told
him that he would pay for the improvements. Upon completion of the
work, the plaintiff filed his claim of lien and within a year sought to fore-
close upon it. Ruke and Mahaffey were joined as party-defendants. The
facts revealed that Ruke was expected to lease the property from Mahaffey
and was not an owner of the premises. However, a lease never materialized
between Ruke and Mahaffey, and Ruke vacated the premises. Mahaffey
answered the complaint by alleging that there was no privity between
144. 156 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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the plaintiff and himself, and therefore that his property could not be
subjected to a mechanics' lien. Also, Mahaffey alleged that the plaintiff
failed to file his notice of pendency of lien within the one-year period as
required by statute.
145
The lower court's decree in favor of the defendants was reversed on
appeal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff was barred from estab-
lishing a mechanics' lien against the property, and dismissed the complaint
entirely as against Ruke because he had no interest in the property. 14
However, the court held, after reviewing Florida cases on this point,
that the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable lien. The court found that
since there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the owner,
the plaintiff never had the right to a mechanics' lien. 47 This coupled with
the fact that Mahaffey's actions of failing to advise Mr. Phelps of the
ownership of the property and of Ruke's interest-or lack of interest-
misled Mr. Phelps, who "innocently and in good faith improved . . .
property, enhancing its value and making it suitable for the contemplated
use." '148 This was held to establish a prima facie case for the equitable
lien.
To be considered in support of the decision is the misrepresentation
or misleading of the plaintiff as to the state of title, and his promise to
pay for the work coupled with reliance thereon to the plaintiff's disadvan-
tage. Further, there was no adequate legal remedy, if indeed any remedy
at all. In addition to the fact that there was no available remedy of me-
chanic's lien, there was not even a remedy on the contract, since the
owner of the land did not contract for its improvement. It is possible
that there could be an action for fraud or deceit, but under the circum-
stances, the imposition of a equitable lien seems most desirable.
Without attempting to state or summarize all of the law relating to
equitable liens arising out of the improvement of real estate, a few observ-
ations may be made. First, if no remedy is available under the Mechanics'
Lien Law, then, of course, that law can have no bearing on the imposition
of such a lien, and such lien may be asserted if circumstances otherwise
warrant. 149 Second, if the lienor does have a remedy under the Mechanics'
145. FiA. STAT. § 84.21 (1961), repealed. See supra note 134. The 1963 Act, Fi. STAT.
§ 84.221 (1963), no longer requires the filing of a notice of pendency in an action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien, but rather, only the action to enforce must be "commenced" within
one year from the filing of the claim of lien.
146. Hence he had nothing which he could subject to the imposition of a lien.
147. Mahaffey and his corporation were treated as one and the same. Since neither
one made the contract for improving the realty, a mechanic's lien could not be imposed
on the owner's land since a mechanic's lien is based on a contract for the improvement of
realty.
148. Supra note 144, at 904. See also Gottesman v. Owen, 172 So.2d 257 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1965), wherein an equitable lien was allowed on the basis that the improver did not
have knowledge of the true state of the title.
149. Ross v. Gerung, supra note 122.
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Lien Law, he is not necessarily barred from obtaining an equitable lien.150
However, none of the cases imposed an equitable lien on an innocent
property owner who was not charged with notice of the possible claim.
Also, the Mechanics' Lien Law is designed to protect land owners as well
as lien claimants. Thus, it appears that an improving owner is not subject
to the imposition of an equitable lien if the owner complies with the Lien
Law in all respects, pays the contract price in accordance with that law,
and does not commit fraud, misrepresentation or other inequitable
conduct. Third, if the lienor makes no attempt to comply with the Lien
Law, if the suit is brought within a period of time permitted by the act,
and if the contracting owner has not paid,15' then the claimant may be
entitled tp an equitable lien.'52 The claimant's position is stronger if the
owner is insolvent, 5 ' or if there were fraud, misrepresentation or mistake
as to the status of title,' but it does not appear that such circumstances
are necessary in all cases. 15 Fourth, if the claimant once proceeds under
the Lien Law and then loses his remedy by noncompliance with further
provisions of the act, as, for example, by delaying enforcement beyond the
statutory period, then the claimant is not entitled to an equitable lien.'56
Under these circumstances, the claimant had an adequate remedy at law
and it was his own lack of diligence that prevented the enforcement of
his lien.
b. Failure to Comply with other Statutory Lien Provisions
In Dewing v. Davis,'57 purchasers under an executory sales contract
were allowed to possess a citrus grove pending completion of the trans-
action. The contract for sale was never consummated, and the plaintiff,
who was hired by the purchasers to manage the grove, was not paid for
his services. The defendant-owner denied liability, but an equitable lien
was imposed on the land for the value of the plaintiff's services. The
Second District Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the lower
court, stated:
One who has performed services or furnished materials in
improving real property is not limited remedially by the Me-
chanics' Lien Law ... but may instead establish an equitable
150. 0. H. Thomason Builders' Supplies, Inc. v. Goodwin, supra note 136 (dicta);
cases cited infra note 152.
151. The owner had not paid in the cases cited infra note 152. A purchaser charged
with notice of the improvement and possible lien is entitled to no superior equity. Tucker v.
Prevatt Builders, Inc., supra note 139; Armstrong v. Blackadar, supra note 143. If the
owner has made improper payments under the provisions of the lien law, it may be that
his position would be the same as if he had not paid so far as equitable liens are concerned.
152. Palmer v. Edwards, supra note 114; Lewinson v. Shaw, supra note 121.
153. Ibid.
154. Phelps v. T. 0. Mahaffey, Inc., supra note 144.
155. Armstrong v. Blackadar, supra note 143.
156. Kimbrell v. Fink, supra note 127; Blanton v. Young, supra note 131.
157. 117 So.2d 747 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
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lien on the property .... The principle thus enunciated relating
to the Mechanics' Lien Law logically may apply as well to
section 85.04, Florida Statutes . . . so that persons who per-
form farm or grove labor are not restricted to the statutory lien
remedy provided by the section, but may under proper circum-
stances proceed to establish an equitable lien.'58
The lien was established "under a general consideration of right and
justice."'1 59 Considerations influencing the decision were that the vendor
had placed the vendee in possession; the vendor knew of the plaintiff's
duties, and that the vendor had reaped the benefit of the plaintiff's services
by receiving the escrowed proceeds from the sale of fruit.160 The court
concluded that since there were grounds for an equitable lien it was un-
necessary to consider the plaintiff's right to a statutory lien under section
85.04 of the Florida Statutes.
In contrast to Dewing v. Davis, the companion case of Dewing v.
Nelson & Co., 6' held that a supplier of fertilizer could not establish an
equitable lien for the value of fertilizer sold to the purchaser in
possession of the grove. In that case the seller made no attempt to satisfy
the requirements of a crop lien, 62 but instead sought a lien against the
realty itself. The court pointed out that, unlike farm labor, fertilizer is
not a product recognized by a protective statute affording a lien against
the land. Thus, had the sale been made directly to the owner, the seller
would not have been entitled to a lien, and accordingly, he was not entitled
to a lien in the instant case.
In a case somewhat similar to the facts in Nelson, the Florida
Supreme Court did allow an equitable lien on the owner's property for
supplies furnished in Industrial Supply Corp. v. Lee. 6' The case cited
Jones v. Carpenter,64 and the analogy was valid. In Jones the landowner
improved his homestead with stolen funds, whereas in Industrial Supply
the purchaser of materials was guilty of fraud. The contracting party
had control and supervision over considerable realty which he improved.
However, he conveyed the legal titles in trust for the benefit of his
children and certain corporations over which he had control. Thus, the
seller of the articles was unaware of the true status of title, and the
purchaser was insolvent at the time of suit. The court analogized the
remedy to that of a constructive trust, 1 5 and imposed an equitable lien
158. Id. at 750.
159. Id. at 751. See supra text accompanying note 19.
160. The proceeds from the sale of fruit were placed in escrow pending the completion
of the sale. When the sale did not materialize, the vendor obtained the proceeds which
otherwise would have been credited to the vendee.
161. 117 So.2d 744 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
162. See, i.e., FLA. STArS. §§ 85.22, 700.01-700.03 (1965).
163. 48 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1950). See 4 U. FLA. L. Rav. 267 (1951).
164. Discussed in text supra following note 29.
165. See supra text following note 5 for a comparison of the two remedies.
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to prevent unjust enrichment. With the debtor insolvent, the legal remedy
would obviously have been inadequate, and his family unjustly enriched,
unless equity gave relief.
4. CITY-PROPERTY OWNERS
In Town of Naples v. Naples Improvement Corp.,' 66 the municipality
sought to establish an equitable lien on property belonging to the defen-
dant-corporation. The claim of lien was predicated on the fact that the
defendant's agent was president of the town council when the town
agreed to grade and pave a street through property that the corporation
was developing. It was alleged that not the town, but abutting owners,
derived most of the benefit from the paved street.
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme
Court noted several facts: the town had made no effort to obtain a statu-
tory lien under charter provisions whereby abutting owners could be
assessed for street improvements; the town accepted the improved street;
the town had ample authority to improve the street; the town council
had four other members in addition to the president, and, although the
president had lived only nine days after the contract was awarded, there
was no attempt by the town to disaffirm the contract. Then, referring to
the Jones case, 67 the court pointed out that there was no written contract
showing an intention to charge the property with a lien. It further found
no justification for a lien under "general consideration of right and
justice. 16 8 In support of this conclusion, the court observed: (a) the,
improvement was not on the defendant's property; (b) the city had
authority under its charter; (c) the acceptance of the street and improve-
ment were within the city's control and not that of the abutting property
owners; and, (d) the city had in fact improved its own property.
5. CO-OBLIrORS
A co-obligor who pays more than his share of the common debt may
accede to the lien of a secured creditor. Thus, in Meckler v. Weiss,'69
when a co-tenant paid a jointly executed mortgage note and then sold
his one-half interest in the property to a third party, it was held that the
paying party was entitled to an equitable lien against the original co-
tenant's undivided one-half interest. The basis of the lien was subrogation
-the claimant being subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee as against
the defendant. The court stated "that equitable liens are based upon the
doctrine of estoppel and 'arise in cases of expenditures by one joint owner
166. 147 Fla. 94, 2 So.2d 383 (1941).
167. Jones v. Carpenter, supra note 138.
168. See supra text accompanying note 19.
169. 80 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1955).
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on real or other property .... 2 W70 The extent of his lien was explained:
".. . but his right of recovery by means of subrogation is limited to
contribution if between them neither had a prior duty of performance."''
6. HUSBAND-WIFE
In Tivas v. Tivas, 72 a divorced husband sought the return of funds
and papers given to an attorney to effectuate a property settlement. The
wife counter-claimed for an equitable lien on the funds because the
husband's property was out of Florida, and she also sought security for
the payment of alimony which was awarded by the court. The supreme
court, noting that a decree of permanent alimony does not create a specific
lien on either the husband's real estate or personalty, held that just
because the husband's other property is out of the state does not constitute
grounds to grant an equitable lien on the property held by the attorney.
An equitable lien in favor of a divorced wife, however, may be allowed
for her contribution in the improvement of the property or the construc-
tion of a house.
1 7 3
A wife has been awarded an equitable lien on property held in the
husband's name when the property was to be subjected to execution for
a judgment debt arising out of the husband's negligence." 4 The lien
was limited to the value of money contributed by her toward the purchase
of the property, plus interest from the date of the acquisition. The result
is justified since she is thereby recovering only her money plus interest;
the execution creditor cannot claim any superior equity from the fact
that legal title was in the husband's name since the claim was based on
negligent conduct. The remedy of the wife in such a case appears to be
a substitute for a resulting trust,7 5 but that remedy was apparently not
appropriate since the wife had only furnished some, and not all of the
money. Apparently a definitely ascertained percentage of the various
purchase prices could not be traced to the wife, the evidence only revealing
a designated amount of money.
Property owned by husband and wife, as tenants by the entireties,
cannot generally be subjected to an equitable lien when the husband
alone purports to create a lien without the wife's acquiescence. 7 6
170. Ibid.
171. Id. at 609.
172. 142 Fla. 703, 196 So. 175 (1940).
173. Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957).
174. Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277, 179 So. 882 (1938).
175. For a labored discussion of resulting trusts, see the two opinions of Mitchell v.
Grapes, 146 So.2d 591 (3d Dist. 1962), quashed, 159 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1964) (discussed in
Boyer & Ross, Survey of Real Property Law, 18 U. MrAi.si L. REv. 799, 813 (1964);
Klein, Trusts and Succession, 20 U. Mimi L. REv. 796 (1966)).
176. Yafanaro v. Ninos, 123 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). See, however, FLA. STAT.
§ 84.121 (1965), as to mechanics' liens.
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B. Advancement of Funds
1. JOINT PURCHASERS
The principle of Foster v. Thornton17 may be applied in any situation
where the purchase money is supplied by one party and title taken in
the name of another. It applies to joint purchasers where the title is taken
in the name of only one of the parties. Thus, in Phelps v. Higgins,78 the
plaintiff advanced thirty-five hundred dollars, and later contributed
another six hundred dollars, toward the purchase of the property. The
defendants took title in their own names and refused to convey any in-
terest to the plaintiff. When plaintiff sought an equitable lien, the lower
court transferred the cause to the law side of the court. The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in reversing, stated:
Although . . . the remedy which is most generally invoked
by the defrauded person especially where the land against which
a claim is being asserted was purchased and not merely im-
proved, with the misappropriated funds, is by asserting a con-
structive trust against the property . . . other courts have held,
wherever an equitable lien has been asserted against property
purchased or improved with fraudulently acquired funds, that
one whose money has been misappropriated may recover it back
by impressing an equitable lien, to the extent of the funds wrong-
fully used upon land which the tortfeasor has purchased or
improved therewith.179
Although the court mentioned only constructive trust as an alternative
remedy, it would appear that the equitable lien could serve just as well
as an alternative remedy to a purchase money resulting trust, the result-
ing trust seeming more appropriate.180 Insofar as the gist of the remedy
is prevention of unjust enrichment, 8 ' however, the constructive trust
may be applicable in all or most cases.
2. PAYMENT OF TAX LIEN
Under appropriate circumstances, as previously indicated, 82 a per-
son paying an obligation of another may be subrogated to the prior held
lien of the creditor. This remedy was considered but held inappropriate
in National Title Co. v. Laramore.88 In this case the defendant pur-
chased property at a sheriff's sale subject to a tax lien.8 , Subsequently,
177. Supra note 174.
178. Phelps v. Higgins, 120 So.2d 633 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
179. Id. at 636.
180. See the citations in note 175 supra; 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1 590 (1954),
and text following note 180 for a discussion.
181. See supra text following note 6.
182. See supra text following notes 11 and 169.
183. 130 Fla. 487, 178 So. 165 (1938). See generally, 1 JoNxs, LIENs § 73 (3d ed. 1914).
184. They had purchased the land subject both to the judgment and tax lien.
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the previous owners of the property voluntarily paid the amount of the
tax lien and conveyed whatever interest they might have to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff then sought an equitable lien for the amount of the tax
lien. The lien was denied. The plaintiff could be subrogated only to
whatever rights the previous owner had. Since the previous owner was a
tax debtor, not a lienor, the fact that he paid the obligation did not give
him a right to a lien against the property.' 8'
3. BENEFIT TO ADVANCER UNREALIZED
Money advanced for the improvement of realty in anticipation of
expected benefits may be a predicate for the imposition of an equitable
lien when the expected benefits fail to materialize. LaMar v. Lechlider,181
previously discussed,"8 7 is illustrative. The lack of an adequate legal
remedy (because of the insolvency of the defendants) plus their otherwise
unjust enrichment, warranted the imposition of an equitable lien on
homestead property, although there was an absence of flagrant fraud.
In Johnson v. Craig,'88 the plaintiff and the defendant (who antici-
pated marriage after he obtained a divorce from his absent wife) cooper-
ated in the purchase and development of a parcel of real estate. The title
to the land was taken in the defendant's name. Her contribution was
money, while that of the plaintiff was labor and services of himself and
friends. After seven years, with no marriage having occurred, the couple
parted friendships and the plaintiff sought to establish a resulting trust
for one-half the value of the realty. The Florida Supreme Court held that
no resulting trust arose, but that if the plaintiff did not make a gift to the
defendant, he might establish an equitable lien for the fair and reasonable
value of the services contributed by himself and friends.
A purchase money resulting trust did not arise because the purchase
money was not paid by the plaintiff with title taken in the defendant's
name under circumstances rebutting the inference of a gift. In fact, the
purchase price was paid by her, not the plaintiff. Further, in two instances
of obtaining mortgage financing, the plaintiff signed that he had no
interest in the property. Thus, there would be lacking the circumstances
giving rise to a purchase money resulting trust. If the services rendered
by himself and friends were held to be a gift, then, of course, the plaintiff
would be entitled to no relief. However, if no gift was intended, he might
get relief by way of an equitable lien. It is to be noted that the case did not
establish an equitable lien, nor did it contain any discussion of the neces-
sity of showing insolvency of the defendant or otherwise indicating the
inadequacy of a legal remedy.
185. See supra text following note 11 for a brief resum6 of subrogation.
186. 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939).
187. See text following note 49.
188. 158 Fla. 254, 28 So.2d 696 (1947).
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Union Trust Co. v. Wittman"' is another case where the contributor
to the improvement of real estate failed to realize the anticipated benefit.
The motivating factor was an adult, incompetent son. The parents were
of old age and felt that they should secure someone to care for the son
after their demise. They had a very close friend who suggested that if
the plaintiff would build an addition on her house she would care for
the plaintiff's son. The addition was built, but after completion the son
would not move onto the premises because allegedly it was unfit for
occupancy. Before his death,190 the plaintiff father instituted a suit to
impress an equitable lien on the defendant's home, alleging that the
defendant refused to give any form of evidence of indebtedness or security
in rem. On appeal, the second district reversed an order of dismissal saying
that the complaint had sufficient equity to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Any equitable lien that would be established would appear to be based
on a "general consideration of right and justice," or the prevention of
"unjust enrichment."''1 1
4. ORAL PROMISE OF SECURITY
An oral promise of security may give rise to an equitable lien. The
analogy or alternative is an equitable mortgage."9 2 In Hullum v. Bre-
Lew Corp., 93 the plaintiffs, husband and wife, advanced sums to the
wife's father who was constructing a motel. These monies were given
for the purpose of discharging a prior incumbrance. The father orally
promised the plaintiffs that they would have the same security as the
prior discharged creditors. However, the father conveyed the property
to a newly formed corporation of which he was the president. The corpor-
ation thereupon granted a mortgage on the property to a third person, and
granted another mortgage to a corporate officer who assigned to a cor-
porate employee.
In a suit by the plaintiffs for an equitable lien, prior in dignity to the
mortgage executed to the corporate officer, the defendant-mortgagee raised
the defense of the Statute of Frauds, contending that an oral security
agreement is unenforceable. The Florida Supreme Court reversed a dis-
missal and held the Statute of Frauds not a valid defense, as the equitable
lien is not an estate or an interest in the property, nor is it a possessory
right. The court further stated that, "Fundamental concepts of equity
189. 145 So.2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
190. After the father's death, his administrator continued the action.
191. Cases cited were: Palmer v. Edwards, supra note 114; Tucker v. Prevatt Builders,
supra note 139; and Jones v. Carpenter, supra note 138.
192. See generally, OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, §§ 24-25 (1951). The characterization of an
equitable lien as not an interest in land may be a sufficient excuse for avoiding the
Statute of Frauds, but once the lien is declared the property owner may lose his land if he
does not otherwise satisfy the lien. See text to note 3. Perhaps specific performance would
be a more forthright explanation.
193. 93 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1957).
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would require that these defendants be required to do that which in equity
and good conscience they should have done voluntarily."' 94
In a case involving personalty,195 the Florida Supreme Court in-
dicated that a bank would be entitled to an equitable lien on the proceeds
of a note collected by a debtor under the presented circumstances. The
debtor, an accommodation indorser, had induced the bank to forego en-
forcement of the note by his promise to pay the bank out of the proceeds
of another note in which he owned an equity. The debtor had collected
the funds and then refused to pay the bank.
In Folsom v. Farmer's Bank 9 ' the defendant had deposited with the
bank a mortgage and note of another, as security for his own indebtedness.
The defendant promised to execute a note and mortgage in the bank's
favor on the property subject to the collateral mortgage, if the bank
would allow him to foreclose on the pledged security. The bank agreed
and gave the defendant custody of the note and mortgage. The defendant
foreclosed on the mortgage and purchased the property at foreclosure.
However, the defendant then conveyed the property to his daughter
without consideration. It was held that the bank acquired an equitable
lien on the property as soon as the defendant became the owner at the
sale. In essence, the basis of the lien was the oral agreement to give
security which could be regarded as an equitable pledge of the property at
the time. An alternative explanation might be specific performance.
C. Defective Mortgages
It is well settled that a defectively executed legal mortgage will be
given effect as an equitable mortgage.'97 Thus, in Boyton v. Williams,'98
the court allowed an equitable lien, which would appear equally effica-
cious,' 99 when the legal mortgage was insufficiently executed.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper was motivated by a desire to formulate a definition,
description, or concise characterization of the equitable lien. It began with
a complaint that the usual explanation of the lien was so general as to be
of doubtful utility. It was hoped that a more meaningful characteriza-
tion could be fabricated. Now that the cases have been examined, how-
ever, that goal seems as elusive as ever. The lien is a remedial device
employable in a wide variety of situations to achieve an equitable result.
If the phrase "general consideration of right and justice" does not appear
194. Id. at 730.
195. Treadwell v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 127 Fla. 40, 172 So. 914 (1937).
196. 102 Fla. 899, 136 So. 524 (1931).
197. OSBOrNE, supra note 192, at § 32.
198. Boynton v. Williams, 108 Fla. 368, 146 So. 663 (1933).
199. See text paragraph following note 38.
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indicative of specific inclusions and exclusions, that is precisely what is
intended. The chief utility of the equitable lien lies in its broad adapta-
bility. By explaining the lien in broad generalities, the courts prevent a
restrictive interpretation and preserve the lien for unforeseen circum-
stances and situations. The reader may get some help from past decisions,
and in this regard it is hoped that this survey will be beneficial, but he
should not regard the equitable lien as a rigidly defined device, incapable
of further adaptation. On the other hand, it is not a remedy universally
applicable for every imagined wrong.
Although summarization is risky, a few observations may be made.
The equitable lien is a creature of equity, and thus general equitable
principles are applicable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the legal remedy
is important. In this regard, insolvency of the defendant, or other cir-
cumstances precluding the enforcement of a judgment against him, should
be considered. Neglect to pursue a legal remedy otherwise available and
already undertaken may preclude the imposition of an equitable lien.
Fraud, misrepresentation, deception and mistake may be significant
factors. The prevention of unjust enrichment may itself give rise to the
imposition of such a lien. Likewise, the equitable lien may be employed
as a substitute remedy for an equitable mortgage, specific performance
of an agreement to give security, a resulting or constructive trust, subro-
gation, or similar remedy. In short, patterns have been established, and
a knowledgeable familiarity with them will aid in the resolution of future
equitable lien controversies, but the malleability of the remedy should
be kept in mind.
